Supreme Court confirms landholder duty on appointment of director
23/03/2026
Taking control of a corporate trustee can trigger landholder duty, even without acquiring land or units. The Supreme Court of Victoria has confirmed that assuming full control of a trustee company may amount to acquiring ‘control’ of the underlying landholding trust under section 82 of the Duties Act 2000 (Vic).
In Tao v Commissioner of State Revenue [2025] VSC 831, the Court held that becoming the sole director and shareholder of a corporate trustee constituted control of the trust itself, exposing the acquirer to landholder duty.
As the first Victorian Supreme Court decision to interpret section 82, the case highlights the provision’s broad reach and serves as a warning that even administrative changes can carry significant tax consequences.
Background of the VCAT decision
The WCT Unit Trust owned a Victorian development property valued at over $1m, making it a landholder under the Duties Act. Its corporate trustee was 66 William Road Pty Ltd. The trust units were held as follows:
- 50 units by Maclaw No. 547 Pty Ltd, as trustee for the Mountain Highway Unit Trust.
- 25 units by Fredco Incorporated Limited, as trustee for Nomsec No. 1 Limited.
- 25 units by Amber Investments Pty Ltd, in which Mr Tao was a majority shareholder.
In 2014, Mr Tao bought four shares in the trustee company 66 William Road Pty Ltd, becoming its sole shareholder. By March of that year, he had also appointed himself as the company’s sole director and secretary. More than five years later, the Commissioner issued a notice assessing duty of roughly $199,650, plus penalties and interest.
The Commissioner’s assessment treated Mr Tao’s assumption of control of the trustee as a ‘relevant acquisition’ of the WCT Unit Trust under section 82 of the Duties Act. The assessment was based solely on his control of the trustee company, even though neither Mr Tao nor Amber Investments Pty Ltd had acquired any additional units in the WCT Unit Trust.
Legal issues
Landholder duty is imposed when a person makes a ‘relevant acquisition’ of an interest in a landholding entity, such as a company or unit trust owning Victorian land worth $1m or more. Typically, this covers acquisitions of significant shareholdings or unit holdings. Section 82, however, is a broad provision that extends to changes in control that do not involve the direct acquisition of an interest.
In essence, section 82(1) provides that if a person ‘acquires control’ of a private landholder by means other than a direct acquisition of an interest, they are deemed to have made a relevant acquisition of 100% of the landholder, or a lesser percentage as determined by the Commissioner.
Section 82(2) defines ‘acquiring control’ as obtaining the capacity to determine or influence the outcome of the landholder’s financial and operating decisions. It makes clear that practical influence, beyond strict legal rights, and the parties’ conduct and behaviour must be considered in assessing control. This broad definition means a person can control a landholding entity without owning it, provided they effectively determine or influence key decisions.
The Supreme Court decision
Mr Tao challenged the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) decision in the Supreme Court of Victoria, seeking leave to appeal.
One ground of appeal was that VCAT failed to treat section 82 as a two-stage test: first, determining whether control has been acquired; and second, if so, exercising the Commissioner’s discretion to deem the acquisition to be less than a 100%. The Court rejected this argument, finding that the VCAT had, in fact, identified Mr Tao’s acquisition of practical control of the WCT Unit Trust through his appointment as sole director and shareholder of the trustee company, and then considered whether to reduce the default 100% deemed acquisition.
VCAT reduced the deemed acquisition to 85% to reflect Mr Tao’s existing indirect interest held by Amber Investments Pty Ltd.
Mr Tao also argued that section 82 should be construed narrowly as an anti-avoidance provision, and that VCAT had misunderstood the purpose of the discretion in paragraph (b). Mr Tao contended that the discretion was intended to reflect the degree to which an effective beneficial interest had been acquired. The Court disagreed, confirming that section 82 is a distinct head of duty, not merely an anti-avoidance mechanism, and that it allows the Commissioner to deem a person to have acquired up to 100% of a landholder simply by acquiring control.
It was held that the discretion under section 82(1)(b) is directed at adjusting the default 100% acquisition where a taxpayer already holds an economic interest, as was the case with Mr Tao. VCAT’s decision to reduce the deemed acquisition to 85% was therefore a lawful and appropriate exercise of that discretion.
Mr Tao further contended that VCAT had ignored numerous factual matters, including the absence of any change in beneficial ownership and the rights of other unit holders. The Court held that these considerations were either raised for the first time on appeal or were irrelevant to the control test and that section 82 focuses on practical control rather than beneficial ownership. Therefore, arguments based on the distinction between legal and equitable interests, or the absence of share transfers, did not undermine the finding that Mr Tao had acquired control.
The Court found that VCAT had considered all factual matters put before it and had properly applied the discretion to reduce the deemed acquisition. As a result, the Court concluded there was no error of law and refused leave to appeal.
Key takeaways
- Taking control of a corporate trustee or landholding company, for example by becoming its sole director, can trigger landholder duty even if no trust units or shares change hands. Any restructure that concentrates decision-making power should be reviewed for duty implications.
- The Court observed that the ability to ‘influence’ may be something less than 50% control. The State Revenue Office website states that:
[Section 82] “can also apply to a person who is appointed to the board of directors of a landholder (or the corporate trustee of a landholder). Provided the shareholders or unit holders have not made arrangements that allow the director to benefit, or exercise rights which confer benefits similar to holding an interest in the landholder, the Commissioner will take the view that the director has not acquired control (and made a relevant acquisition of an interest of 100%) as a result of such an appointment.”
- In the Supreme Court, the Commissioner argued that this statement was intended to apply only to multi-director companies, including trustee companies, and not to companies with a sole director. However, given the Supreme Courts observation that ‘influence’ may arise with less than 50% control, the appointment of a director to a multi-director company could also, in some circumstances, trigger section 82.
- Section 82 is broad. The duty is not confined to anti-avoidance scenarios but operates as a standalone head of duty even where there is no relevant acquisition in the landholder. Consequently, acquisitions that are exempt under section 89D, such as the appointment of receivers, liquidators, executors or administrators, may nevertheless be liable for duty as an acquisition of control.
- The Commissioner’s discretion is limited. It is primarily directed at preventing double taxation of an existing economic interest, rather than operating as a general waiver of liability.
How SW can help
Navigating the nuances of landholder duty and trust structures can be complex. SW’s state taxes team is closely monitoring these developments. If you are contemplating changes to a trust’s structure or a corporate trustee, or if you suspect past changes may have inadvertently triggered a duty exposure, our team can help review your situation and manage any landholder duty risks.
